INTRODUCTION
As argued in Chapter 6, Maastricht provides the EU member states with the means to develop a truly integrated and coherent antiterrorist policy. In a number of significant ways its measures represent a considerable practical improvement over the ad hoc and piecemeal response that was initiated before its inception. However, as Chapter 5 made clear, for a liberal anti-terrorist policy to be truly effective, it also has to be regarded as socially legitimate. For this to happen, it is vital that any strategy initiated is tempered by those overall guiding principles which help to prevent an erosion of the standards and traditions that make a democratically liberal way of life possible in the first place.
As with operational effectiveness, it is only really possible to make a valid assessment of the democratic acceptability of the Maastricht third pillar with respect to counterterrorism once its performance becomes more evident over time. However, the following observations, made in respect to the general character of the TEU's internal security provisions, suggest that achieving an anti-terrorist policy which is consistent with the standards of acceptability as developed in Chapter 5 could be highly problematic: Limitation is being undermined by the increasingly explicit tendency to regard entire ethnic/racial groups as potential high risk threats to internal security; credibility is being strained by the conspicuous lack of critical debate that has come to surround the third pillar's initiation as well as by the failure, hitherto, to implement effective international data protection rules; and accountability has all but been made non-existent thanks to the intergovernmental nature of virtually all of the TEU's internal security provisions.
This chapter will examine each of these concerns in turn, concluding with an assessment of the likely philosophical and strategic consequences of a failure to abide by limited, credible and accountable anti-terrorist responses.
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Limitation
The first requirement of any liberal response to terrorism is the need for a limited, well-defined strategy that does not go beyond what is demanded by the exigencies of the situation and which is directed only against the terrorists themselves. By contrast, it appears that much of the substance of the Maastricht third pillar is being guided by an underlying ideological rationale that implicitly, and increasingly explicitly, identifies all immigrants and foreigners as a major, or at least significant, threat to internal security. No longer preoccupied by the external menace of communism, EU member states have begun to turn their attention and resources to an increasingly threatening 'enemy within', defined as terrorism, drug trafficking and organized crime. In light of the many dangers that look set to plague West European states in the post-ColdWar era (see Chapter 4), this can, to a certain extent, be viewed as a rational response to an increasingly unstable internal and external environment. However, rather than restricting itself to those elements that are definitively associated with these threats, the Maastricht third pillar also appears to have become embroiled in a type of 'post-McCarthyite witch hunt' involving the systematic criminalization of entire immigrant and foreign groupings.
The tendency to equate ethnic groups with crime by West European police and security forces is nothing new. It arises as a result of three interrelated suspicions. The first stems from the notion that those deprived of adequate living standards in their own societies will be attracted to the relative prosperity of Western Europe and, hence, will try illegally to infiltrate these societies by exploiting liberal judicial frameworks.
1 The second flows from the first in that it obscures the status of those already established within an immigrant community by reinforcing the view that these populations have a 'natural' propensity for crime and are therefore more susceptible to illicit, underground activities.
2 The third rests on the further assumption that, since illegal migrants are largely prevented from obtaining welfare services or gaining legal employment, they will necessarily be forced into crime in order to establish a living for themselves.
